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ABSTRACT
Cooperative labor parties known throughout the Andes as mingas, although outwardly appearing to
be the same cultural institution, are practiced quite differently and with varying meanings in
different socio-economic contexts. This article discusses how minga cooperation came to exhibit
contrasting, yet intimately related, patterns of practice and social relationships in both a displaced,
disaster-affected village and a disaster-induced resettlement. It describes actors in these groups
appealing to ostensibly common repertoires of shared meaning and culture, while organizing
themselves in distinct ways in order to access and control scarce resources. In one village, minga
participation is largely sustained through traditional practices of reciprocity, while in the other they
are maintained through new institutional strategies. In the former, mingas are mobilized to compete
with other villages for scarce resources; in the latter, minga participants compete with one another.
KEYWORDS: Andes, Ecuador, disaster, labor, mingas, reciprocity, state

RESUMEN
Obreros cooperativos conocidos en toda la región andina como mingas, aunque exteriormente
aparecen como la misma institución cultural, se practican de manera muy diferente y con distintos
significados en diferentes contextos. Este estudio analiza cómo la cooperación minga llegó a exhibir
patrones contrastantes, pero íntimamente relacionados, de prácticas y relaciones sociales, tanto en
un pueblo afectado y desplazado por un desastre y un reasentamiento inducida por el desastre.
Describo cómo los actores en estos diferentes grupos apelan a repertorios aparentemente comunes
de significado y la cultura compartida, mientras se organizan de distintas maneras con el fin de
acceder y controlar los recursos escasos. En un pueblo, la participación minga se sustenta en gran
medida a través de las prácticas tradicionales de reciprocidad, mientras que en el otro se sostienen a
través de nuevas estrategias institucionales. En el primero, se movilizan mingas para competir con
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otros pueblos de escasos recursos, mientras que en la segunda minga participantes compiten entre
sí dentro del reasentamiento.
PALABRAS CLAVES: Andes, Ecuador, desastres, trabajo, mingas, reciprocidad, estado

This article examines practices of Andean cooperation and reciprocity in disaster-affected
communities and resettlements in the Ecuadorian highlands. Cooperative labor parties known
throughout the Andes as mingas, although outwardly appearing to be the same cultural institution,
are practiced quite differently and with varying meanings in diverse contexts. Historically,
anthropological studies have emphasized minga practice as egalitarian exchange labor, or as a
practice embedded in patron–client relationships underwritten by conspicuous giving in exchange
for labor. Recent scholarship, however, has identified minga practice as a key tactic in village-level
statecraft, where it operates as a leveling mechanism that neutralizes status differences while
mobilizing labor in the service of shared interests.
Minga practice has long been a feature of Andean statecraft. Historically, mingas were
mechanisms of the state subordination and regulation of rural peripheries employed by the Incas
(Rostworowski and Morris 1999), Spanish colonial administrators (Stern 1988), and hacendados (Salz
1984); they extracted free labor from indigenous and peasant groups for public works and even
personal profit. However, following political reforms, social movements, and the proliferation of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that characterized Ecuador in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, minga came to be a central feature of civil society, participatory governance,
and development strategies (Cameron 2010; Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Faas 2015).
This study focuses on minga practice in the context of disaster recovery and resettlement.
Research in situations of crisis and change enables scholars to interrogate the structures of state and
society as they are exposed under these conditions (Faas and Barrios 2015). Here, we find forms of
human agency contesting social structures and revealing important aspects of society and culture
that might otherwise be obscured. Disasters involve varying degrees of change in patterns of
individual and group access to resources, institutions, and services, which can compound their
vulnerability and suffering. Thus, informal relations of social support or mutual aid that accompany
disaster and displacement are of paramount importance (Faas and Jones 2016). Focusing on minga
practice is particularly compelling in the study of disaster recovery in the Andes; as Anthony OliverSmith (1977) established following disaster in the highlands of Peru, cooperation in disaster recovery
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and the tensions between egalitarian ideals and class distinctions have long been important factors
in the Andes. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether Andean reciprocity and cooperative
labor constitute “threatened form*s+ of social insurance” in contexts of scarcity (Wutich 2007).
In the context of trends of state centralization and decentralization that characterized
Ecuador in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, whether minga—a practice that
constitutes a key nexus of local and extra-local power—is a vehicle for status leveling and
participatory governance, or for class-based, patron–client relations that remain central in the
politics of rural Ecuador, is crucial. Moreover, power dynamics tend to be overlooked in studies of
social support and mutual aid in disasters and resettlement, so this study examines the extent to
which minga facilitates the exercise of collective or individual power. I describe how actors appealing
to purportedly common repertoires of shared meaning and culture organized themselves in distinct
ways to access and control scarce resources—primarily water and outside development aid.

Resettlement and Revanche: Penipe, Pusuca, and Manzano
This study investigates minga practice in two communities of mestizo, smallholder agriculturalists in
Canton Penipe, a rural municipality in the central Andean cordillera in the predominantly indigenous
Chimborazo Province of Ecuador on the southern rim of the active stratovolcano Mt. Tungurahua.
The first, Manzano, is a community of 52 households; the second, Pusuca, is a disaster-induced
resettlement of 40 households. State agencies and NGOs began constructing resettlements in 2007–
2008 for those displaced by the devastating Mt. Tungurahua eruptions in 1999 and 2006. The
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MIDUVI) constructed one resettlement consisting of
185 homes built on a landless urban grid in Canton Penipe’s main town, Penipe. Alongside these, the
US-based, Christian Evangelical disaster relief organization Samaritan’s Purse built an additional 102
homes. Roughly five kilometers to the south, the Ecuadorian NGO, Fundación Esquel, constructed 45
homes to create a hilltop resettlement named Pusuca, for resettlers from around a dozen
neighboring villages—nearly half from the village of Pungal de Puela. Unlike the urban development
built by the state and Samaritan’s Purse in the town of Penipe, Pusuca included just over half a
hectare of land for each household as well as additional plots for communal use.
Some people soon migrated away from Penipe in search of employment, but the majority
returned daily by bus or by hitching a ride to their former communities at the foot of the volcano—
where regularly falling volcanic ash had degraded the soil and continued to present health and
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safety risks—to tend to their crops and animals. Soon after, one-time Manzano residents who
resettled in Penipe began to organize mingas in Manzano on a bi-weekly basis for projects including
irrigation, potable water, and village road maintenance; they also worked to attract development
resources and projects from the state and NGOs. In the Pusuca resettlement, a village council
created by Esquel also organized weekly mingas for irrigation, potable water, and miscellaneous
community projects.
These sites were selected for this study because they were both known to organize regular
mingas through village councils, and because state agencies and NGOs operated initiatives in each,
offering construction materials, project funding, food aid, and micro-projects in relation to irrigation,
potable water, greenhouses, livestock programs, and agricultural extension. The communities also
differed in matters of land, hazard exposure, and ties to external institutions. The Pusuca
resettlement included land for crops and animals for each resettler household, while most Manzano
villagers (many still owned land in Manzano) were relocated to the Penipe resettlement with no
land, productive resources, or employment opportunities. Second, while Pusuca lies well beyond Mt.
Tungurahua’s high risk zone, Manzano sits in the shadow of the volcano and its people had to
contend with a chronic hazard situation that placed their animals, crops, property, and health at risk.
Finally, both villages were tied to state agencies and NGOs in ways that influenced local governance.
As demonstrated below, the influences of state agencies and NGOs factored more heavily in minga
practice than land or hazards, but these influences were channeled in specific and significant ways
by local actors.

Reciprocity or Vernacular Statecraft?
Some scholars have found that minga practice is based on reciprocal exchange relations, while more
recent work has found it operates it as a leveling device of local governance. In addition, some have
found minga practice associated with cooperative, egalitarian organization, but describe minga
relationships in the post-colonial hacienda era as caste-like or “semi-feudal” (Alberti 1970). With the
decline of the hacienda political economy, minga practice evolved differently throughout the Andes.
Importantly, although minga has its roots in pre-Colombian practices of highland, indigenous
Quechua/Quichua speakers, the practice has been drawn on—by Incas, Spanish colonial
administrators, hacendados, and contemporary states and NGOs—and adopted by various
indigenous, campesino, and Afro-Latin groups throughout the region. In some places, mingas
emerged as a form of reciprocity based on repeated, voluntary, and dyadic agreements between
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ostensibly equal parties (Mayer 2002; Orlove 1977). In many cases, this took the form of patron–
client relations, where individuals recruited laborers by including them in exclusive exchange
relations, or forms of conspicuous giving similar to concentric reciprocity, where labor flows to
central actors who then redistribute wealth while accumulating power and prestige.
During fieldwork in 2009, mingas appeared in each village to be organized by village councils,
independent of the reciprocal exchange practices and political allegiances that were part of
quotidian life in both communities. Minga practice initially appeared consistent with what Rudi
Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009) refers to as “vernacular statecraft,” or the administrative ordering of
society at the village level that enables local action and the formation of inter-community alliances
where “the state” is notably absent. I returned in 2011 to explore both how mingas were practiced
as forms of reciprocity—in which laborers were recruited by leaders through reciprocal exchange—
and the extent to which minga practice functioned as a form of vernacular statecraft.

Minga Reciprocity
Norman Whitten’s (1969) study of Afro-Ecuadorian villages in coastal Ecuador remains one of the
richest descriptions of patron–client reciprocity in minga practice. He described how key individuals
in village communities who had unique access to market resources and capital were consistently
able to recruit laborers to mingas from which they alone profited by means of conspicuous giving to
workers’ families. Village work leadership was rationalized as a rotating position for which anyone
with accumulated prestige was eligible; however, leadership remained relatively constant and only a
few local elites sustained the prestige that legitimized leadership. The same leaders recruited the
same work parties repeatedly, and yielded significant profit in the process. However, the workers did
not concede permanent loyalty to leaders, who therefore had to recruit workers anew for each
project. A leader’s ability to replicate the class structure was itself a measure of his prestige, which
was produced through repeated practices of conspicuous giving to laborer households; loans and
gifting converted leaders’ economic capital into the symbolic capital of prestige.
A wealth of ethnographic evidence strikingly similar to Whitten’s portrayal can be found in
studies among indigenous and campesino communities in Ecuador (Ferraro 2004), Peru (Deere 1990;
Mayer 2002; Mitchell 1991), and Colombia (Rappaport 1998). This suggests that class distinctions are
inextricably bound up in minga practice, as wealthier families and individuals rely on poorer
community members in proportion to the scarcity of labor, while laborers depend on wealthier
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community members for access to consumption and production resources. In surveying the flow of
exchanges in minga reciprocity, a generalized pattern emerges in which material resources tend to
flow downward, while labor and loyalty flow from the bottom up, despite discursive renderings of
mingas as egalitarian practices. Cultural rules frequently dictate that minga labor must be repaid in
kind (Orlove 1977), but many regularly avoid this through substituting labor with food and feasting
(Deere 1990; Mayer 2002), alcohol (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009), household items (Harris 2000), or
loans and payment (Gonzáles de Olarte 1994). Minga thus develops into a process of perpetual labor
recruitment via repeated practices of conspicuous giving to laborer households, with redistribution
qua reciprocal exchange periodically facilitating the flow of accumulated wealth and goods from
elites to commoners.

Minga Statecraft
The gradual decline in the hacienda system in the mid twentieth century was accompanied by the
establishment of village councils whose decision-making and practical capacities were established by
law and facilitated by minga practice in various ways. These village councils form the basis for local
governance and relations between communities and outside actors. A study of 131 villages in
Chimborazo identified the primary functions of village councils as organizing mingas and village
assemblies, searching for external institutional support and funding, and implementing community
projects (Cadena and Mayorga 1988).
In his ethnography of Kichwa civil society and indigenous mobilizations in the northern
highlands of Ecuador, Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009: 17) describes mingas as standardized and
regulated by list-making (attendance-taking) practices that level status differences by compelling all
to participate on the same terms. Village councils achieved their objectives by simplifying and
standardizing information about their populations, resources, and environment. These standardized
forms enabled village councils to “administer, persuade, and at times coerce residents to move
toward a common purpose” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 7). Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009: 6) dubs this
kind of locally imposed legibility “vernacular statecraft”—the primary tools of which are list making,
council formation, boundary drawing, and inter-regional contacts. List making is a leveling
mechanism that neutralizes differences in status and conflicting interests by creating “a special
domain of value” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 99), known in Penipe as the raya (attendance credit),
which all households were expected to earn through participation. Failure to earn rayas in Penipe
was sanctioned by fines and exclusion from community affairs, development projects, and common

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

resources, such as irrigation (Faas 2017). Unlike the reciprocal exchange variation on minga practice,
mingas in the vernacular statecraft model are said to neutralize patron–clientelism with the leveling
mechanism of rayas that holds all households equally accountable for equal contributions of labor.
Moreover, as discussed below, minga practice in Pusuca was further standardized by imposing a task
system that specified the expected work output of each participant.

Statecraft and Bureaucratic Power as Practice
Recent anthropological approaches to the state dissolve distinctions between state and civil society.
Instead of a coherent system producing uniform actions, it is useful to consider the disaggregated,
competing, and often incoherent agendas of actors and units within the state (Gupta 2012), and to
interrogate sets of practices, choreographies, and discourses (Lund 2006; Taussig 1997), often at the
margins of the nation state (Das and Poole 2004: 3). However, the practice of statecraft (vernacular
or otherwise) is a project of modernity—rendering subjects and landscapes legible through the
imposition of boundaries, the enumeration and categorization (deserving or undeserving) of bodies,
and the formalization of rules for conduct (Appadurai 1996; Scott 1998). Such acts of legibilization
often provide rationalistic cover for tacitly political practices (Ferguson 1994). These intersections of
power imposed from without and expressed from within local communities can simultaneously
constitute “a relationship of domination and an invitation to protest” (Walton 1992: 307).
Conceiving of statecraft as a choreography of practices and discourses principally concerned with
rendering subjects and landscapes legible with the veneer of legitimate authority, the present work
examines the lived experiences of minga practice and the quotidian lives of disaster resettlers in
highland Ecuador.
State agencies and NGOs also impose their values, expert knowledge, and esoteric
organizational practices upon local institutions and practices in disaster contexts (Faas and Barrios
2015). Humanitarian organizations are frequently complicit in refashioning disaster-affected places
and peoples as extensions of global networks of gifting and reciprocity, which can reproduce
unequal distributions of power, risk, and vulnerability, and reify the subaltern positions of aid
recipients (Gamburd 2013). In Ecuador, the state has decentralized its budget and governance
strategies over several decades. These strategies are nominally participatory (mostly public review),
and intended to expand public works to reach rural regions throughout the country (Cameron 2010).
However, despite dedicating a portion of state oil revenues to rural development since the 1970s,
the state has been unable to keep pace with its infrastructure development goals with its limited
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budget. In Chimborazo, the Provincial Council committed part of its annual participatory
development funds to purchasing raw materials and funding limited professional oversight for
infrastructure projects. This entailed a contractual commitment from village beneficiaries that they
would perform the project labor by organizing mingas. The state then imposed conditions for the
structures and procedures of minga practice in exchange for project inclusion. NGOs have played a
significant role in facilitating state participatory projects, directly funding community-based microprojects, and tending to prefer to work with large indigenous populations and villages that
demonstrate community organization (Bretón and Garcia 2003; Cameron 2010). This study therefore
paid special attention to the roles of the state and NGOs in shaping minga practice and the extent to
which the practice is coopted or transformed in the image of external sponsors’ ideas about Andean
culture.

Methodology
In 2009 and 2011, I lived in Penipe at the edge of the resettlement area and participated in dozens of
mingas and village council meetings in both Pusuca and Manzano. I joined in people’s daily lives,
assisted with farm work and errands, and accompanied village leaders as they organized mingas and
projects. Using interviews and observations, I documented how decisions were made, and by whom,
regarding minga practice and participation, sanctions for non-participation, and project and resource
inclusion; and the frequent exchanges of prepared meals, crop shares, cash loans, tool loans,
randimpa (dyadic labor reciprocity), and peon (labor exchanged for three meals and around
$10/day). I conducted oral history interviews with villagers and collected village archival histories
from municipal records.

Statecraft and Modernity in Manzano and Pusuca
Three key village council strategies—organizing mingas, brokering outside support, and
implementing projects—have proven equally instrumental in domination and democratization;
exclusion and inclusion; peasant and indigenous political movements; and processes of political
centralization and decentralization. The latter constitute twin elements of an Andean modernity that
work to render legible the rural peripheries. The 1937 Ley de Organización y Régimen de Comunas
was designed to grant members of indigenous communities with at least fifty households rights to
plots of land they had worked for more than ten years—as long as they formally incorporated into
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villages (comunas). Village councils (cabildos) were established as local governing bodies but also as
village representatives to the state. Although many peasant and indigenous groups incorporated as
villages in the 1930s and 1940s, many chose not to, as the legislation was perceived as an extension
of state power over rural peasant and indigenous populations (Becker 1999: 535).
Penipe—then a parish of Canton Guano—incorporated its first two villages in 1938, followed
by another ten between 1946 and 1960; it began to serve as a satellite market for a growing number
of smallholders in the region. The military juntas that ruled Ecuador during the 1960s and 70s
introduced successive reform programs to hasten the demise of the hacienda system and modernize
the Ecuadorian economy (Ayala Mora 1999; Becker 1999; Bretón 2008). While addressing disparities
in land distribution, these reforms also fostered renewed interest in village incorporation throughout
Ecuador—including Manzano in 1973—which continued through the 1990s. Penipe incorporated as
the seventh canton of Chimborazo Province in 1984, becoming one of the smallest municipalities in
the country. The central town, Penipe, formed the administrative center for the canton’s six rural
parishes. Such rural municipal governments have historically focused on small public works that have
largely excluded the rural periphery of each canton; the proliferation of these rural municipalities
has been associated with weak institutions dominated by elites and clientelist politics (Cameron
2010).
Beginning in the mid 1980s, indigenous organizations increasingly gained power. These
movements facilitated the rise of populist politicians and charismatic indigenous leaders, including in
Chimborazo Province, which resulted in an acceleration of decentralization programs and
participatory governance reforms (Cameron 2010; Martínez 2003), a proliferation of NGOs (Bretón
2001), and the emergence of mingas as instruments of local development. Since the 1990s, rural
municipalities like Penipe have worked to create local development plans with NGOs and establish
participatory plans with councils at village, parish, municipal, and provincial levels (Bretón 2001;
Cameron 2010; Martínez 2003). These programs relied heavily on minga work parties to expand
limited budgetary capacities for the completion of infrastructure projects in Penipe and throughout
Chimborazo.
From the late 1990s, the federal government attempted to resolve persistent issues with
weak, corrupt municipal governments by accelerating programs to facilitate modernization and
administrative decentralization (Cameron 2010). One landmark development was the creation of
rural parish councils in the constitution of 1998 and in the 2000 Ley Organica de Juntas Parroquiales
(Martínez 2003: 162). These pieces of legislation were established to increase decision-making

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

power in rural parishes, while facilitating the coordination of funding, projects, and administration
between village councils. Around the same time as the resettlements were constructed, President
Rafael Correa’s administration also countered the decades-old process of decentralization with new
ministries and reforms of local governing institutions to exert more centralized control over
foundations, NGOs, and civil society. This process of recentralization expanded executive power
while provincial-level and local governing bodies continued to promote decentralization.
The stated goals of decentralization initiatives were to facilitate participatory rural
development while reining in corruption and clientelism (Cameron 2010; Martínez 2003). However,
critics observed that socioeconomic power relations remained unequal and dominated by persistent
problems associated with clientelism, populism, corruption, instability, and economic crises
(Cameron 2010: 4). Moreover, municipal governments such as Penipe, much like parish councils, are
scarcely more than administrative centers for rural regions with little in the way of urban economies.
They have insufficient funding for their administrative activities and consequently rely heavily on
federal allocations. In Penipe, accusations of favoritism and clientelism in government were
common, with municipal, parish, and village leaders commonly accused of steering funds and other
resources to their client bases, while excluding others. Yet clientelism is itself hotly contested in
Ecuador; Carlos de la Torre and Steve Striffler (2008) find that while some decry the practice as
reproducing racial and class hierarchies, others support a subaltern clientelism that could promote
the interests of the poor through brokerage networks.

Exchange Practices and Minga Participation
The more reciprocal exchange relations a household had with other households in Manzano, the
more likely it was to participate in mingas. This was not the case in Pusuca, where list-making had a
greater leveling effect in minga practice. The following examination of exchange practices, gossip,
and list-making in each site indicates that while leaders in Manzano employed some of the devices
associated with the specter of statecraft, minga practice was largely organized through reciprocal
exchange relations. In Pusuca, by contrast, minga practice entailed greater leveling and legibility,
which are associated with vernacular statecraft.

Minga Practice in Manzano
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What I found in Manzano was more consistent with the model of minga as based on people’s
reciprocal exchange relations. Manzano’s minga organizing was built on personal relationships
rather than any uniform policy, in terms of how participants were recruited (or excluded) and in the
ways leaders reciprocated. In Manzano, kin and households that had been neighbors for generations
engaged in all forms of reciprocity, including frequent generalized reciprocal exchanges that bound
together individuals and households. Council leaders organized mingas and noted attendance at
each. According to villagers, the practice of list-making was revived when the village began
organizing after resettlement to rebuild in the volcanic zone, but also because local leaders
witnessed state and NGO enthusiasm for achieving project goals through mingas and saw this as an
opportunity to attract outside resources for disaster recovery. When I observed minga practice in
Manzano, all village mingas were organized by one man, Bernardo,1 who was council president for
12 years. Bernardo was in his late thirties—relatively young for a village president. His atypical
height—well over six feet—and frequent soliloquies about the solidarity of Manzano and their
struggles to recover and reclaim their livelihoods made him an imposing and galvanizing force in the
community and beyond. Among the largest landowners in Manzano, Bernardo also had unique ties
to municipal and provincial government and local NGOs, meaning that he could broker outside
resources for the village.
Although list-making was a central part of minga practice, and participation was a frequently
stated condition of inclusion in projects and resources such as irrigation, inclusion did not
correspond highly with minga participation. Instead, those most commonly included were most
tightly bound to the core group through reciprocal exchange relations. Those who rarely attended
mingas, but regularly supported council leaders and engaged in reciprocity with other members of
the core group, would often be included in exclusive projects or meetings with outside
organizations. As village leaders struggled to mobilize their villages for recovery, the few who
expressed dissent from their plans were subjected to a sort of malign neglect, not informed of local
initiatives, and excluded from mingas, projects, and exchange relations. The remaining villagers
conveyed a convincing front of unity and solidarity, rarely gossiping about others’ politics or
participation: they often trumpeted their solidarity in contrast with neighboring villages, with which
they saw themselves in competition for outside resources.
Bernardo engaged in perpetual recruitment exercises, routinely making rounds in Manzano
and the Penipe resettlement in his white pickup truck to invite participants. His invitations were
almost always accompanied by the promise of tangible benefits, such as new services or microdevelopment project inclusion. One day, Bernardo invited me to a minga he was organizing. We
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

drove around the Penipe resettlement while he recruited Manzano participants, explaining that he
was organizing the minga to perform maintenance and weeding around the potable water system.
He had just come from meeting with the Parish Council (Junta Parroquial) and the municipal
government where he learned that Manzano could recover more than US$15,000, which he claimed
was owed to them, to repair and expand the potable water system, but they would have to
demonstrate a united front and organize mingas. I mentioned that he was driving past Manzano
homes in the resettlement and asked why he did not inform them. He responded that some people
were simply too difficult and uncooperative and, when I mentioned one woman in particular, he
complained that she and her sisters never supported his initiatives and were a constant source of
dissention. Over time, I noticed that Bernardo recruited roughly the same thirty households for each
minga and meeting, while regularly ignoring several others.
Weeks later, Bernardo was organizing a community workshop in Manzano on disaster
response and recovery. Given local reluctance to label the area a disaster or risk zone,2 I asked him
why they were doing this. He said that representatives from the recently developed Secretariat of
Peoples, Social Movements, and Citizen Participation (Secretaria de Los Pueblos, Movimientos
Sociales y Participacion Ciudadana) were organizing this workshop to “bring projects” to the area. He
wanted to have as many people as possible to make an impression on the representatives from the
Secretariat. He encouraged me to attend more to fill the room than for my research purposes, and
he recruited friends from neighboring villages, while ignoring the same Manzano households as
before. The week before the workshop was scheduled, Manuel Orozco, a Manzano villager in his
early thirties, was sitting outside the village meeting house, listening as Bernardo and I spoke about
mingas. Manuel averred that he would like to work on community mingas, but no one ever let him
know when they were. Bernardo did not acknowledge his comments. My data on local reciprocal
exchanges indicate that Manuel was one of the least connected to others in Manzano through
exchange relations.
At each minga, either Bernardo or the village council secretary made a list of attendees.
Noting this, I expected Bernardo to have organized records. Instead, when I asked him for them, he
dug around in his house and under his bed and produced more than a dozen half-completed
children’s notebooks with minga lists, many of which were undated. When I visited the secretary to
collect her lists, I found that hers were in the same state. The lists were seemingly instruments of the
moment more than historical records; that is, list-making was a tool to emphasize to participants
that their presence or absence would be noted, but they did not become systematized archives.
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Record keeping was instead an operation of memory; occasional participants were unlikely to
receive the same social recognition or reinforcement as others.
A common task in mingas was the clearing of ash, soil, overgrowth, and other debris from
irrigation canals, potable water systems, and roads. Village leaders often broke off from the groups
and walked ahead with machetes, supposedly to clear larger overgrowth. Leaders also periodically
made a show of gifts to people in the village, which could take multiple forms, but were usually
either food or alcohol. In Manzano, Bernardo was occasionally absent for all or part of a minga, but
later arrived with sweet breads and soft drinks for the laborers. He also regularly paid some of the
women to purchase snacks and soft drinks for village meetings. In the weeks leading up to the fiesta
of Saint Michael, Bernardo intoned that his household would bear the special responsibility of
feeding the large band that would play for the village, each time emphasizing that he was not
wealthy, but would carry this expense to benefit the group. It was also common for village leaders to
bring bottles of puro (home-distilled cane alcohol) to mingas. On other occasions, Bernardo
purchased cases of 22 -ounce beer bottles to gift to workers and meeting attendees. Often, after the
first case was consumed, one or more of the lesser leaders would send out for another case at their
own expense. During village fiestas, Bernardo or another council member often purchased a case or
more of beer for villagers.
While leaders contributed scant labor, and instead made conspicuous gifts to other workers,
gossip about participation was trained outward to other communities, not to others within
Manzano. When I took photographs at one Manzano minga, several women told me I should take
pictures of minga labor in other villages, where they “just sit around not working.” At several parishwide meetings, Manzano resident Frederico Castro complained loudly that too many people from
neighboring villages only worked for themselves: it was only Manzano that worked for everyone.
Such refrains were common among villagers.

Minga Practice in Pusuca
In Pusuca, mingas were organized by the elected village council whose bylaws were drafted in
collaboration with the Esquel Foundation. Mingas were announced at monthly village council and
weekly committee meetings, and attendance was mandatory. Attendance was meticulously
recorded by council or committee secretaries and archived in spreadsheets on a community
computer donated by Esquel. In addition to rayas, Pusuca practiced a tarea (task) system for minga
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duties. Tareas—such as hauling a certain quantity of materials to a designated location or digging a
ditch of one meter width, one meter depth, and ten meter length—were uniformly assigned to every
household for each minga, and rayas were only awarded when tareas were complete. The sanction
for nonparticipation was elimination from the projects. There were opportunities for those in arrears
to make up rayas by bringing additional laborers (family, friends, or paid laborers) to complete
multiple tasks, paying fines, or by completing additional tasks on non-minga days.
Leadership power was less concentrated in Pusuca than in Manzano. In 2011, positions on
the village council and several village committees (irrigation, potable water, credit union) were held
by people who were formerly both economically and politically marginal. Women and individuals
from land-poor households were more represented on the Pusuca village council and committees
than in those same organizations in area villages. The new president, Angel Turushina, was a young
man who came from a relatively poor family that formerly lived on a hacienda. His influence (and
probably his election) was aided by the many kin he had in the resettlement, but he was generally
perceived as an intelligent and just leader whose youth and new ideas were an ideal break from the
previously entrenched political power of wealthy landowners.
Unlike village councils in the rural parishes, where women only occasionally had leadership
roles, women were well represented on the village council and on other committees in the village
and played active roles in decision-making. Moreover, many of the women who increasingly assumed
leadership roles were from economically marginal households. Judith Guamushi was a mother of two
young girls whose soft-spoken husband was often away working their fields or in his part-time job as
a driver. As the secretary of the Irrigation Committee, Judith often demonstrated more leadership
and exerted more power than its male president, yet she and her extended family were among the
poorest, with little land or livestock, and for generations they had been cheap peon labor for their
better-off neighbors. By contrast, in 2011, it was often Judith —stocky, indefatigable, and
outspoken—who dictated work responsibilities on mingas, tracking rayas, and calling out people she
perceived as shirking responsibilities. She was also one of the most vocal contributors at village
meetings.
Despite strong leadership by presidents or some committee heads, the process of decisionmaking in Pusuca appeared generally participatory, with little power vested in the elected leadership.
This was partially because all decisions were voted on and also because, ever since Pusuca’s founding
in 2008, the meetings were monitored and moderated by an ever-present representative from the
Esquel Foundation, Martha Santiago. In contrast to the bombast of many village leaders, Martha was
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petite and unassuming, but spoke with authority and guided discussions with a focus on the
practicalities of often hotly contested issues. Village council meetings began at 7pm on the first
Saturday of every month and often ran as late as midnight, as each item on the meeting’s typically
modest agenda was met with impassioned debate. Unlike Manzano, where debate and gossip
focused on the comparative legitimacy and eligibility of villages around them, debate and gossip in
Pusuca focused almost exclusively on the relative legitimacy and eligibility of the resettlers within the
community. Agenda items often involved reporting on irrigation canal progress, potable water, minga
schedules and opportunities for those in arrears, status updates on basic village services, and
invitations to participate in micro-development projects, such as agricultural extension training and
farm-to-table programs. Yet, each agenda item, no matter its significance, was met with debate
about who was deserving of project inclusion, who was behind or current with dues and
responsibilities, and how people should be sanctioned. When these items almost inevitably reached
their boiling point, or when village leaders brokered arguably pyrrhic resolutions—as when they once
voted to evict a man from the village for missing too many mingas because they doubted the veracity
of a doctor’s note—the Esquel representative eventually stepped in and brokered a peace that was
always accepted, if not always welcomed.
Because Esquel had the final say over who could access key resources such as irrigation and
projects, villagers kept watchful eyes on each other, and gossip or outright protest about who had
participated or completed their duties (or not) was a constant feature of mingas, village meetings,
and daily conversations. While community members fortified the list-making practice by means of
their wary, communal panopticon, the entire endeavor was mediated by the Esquel Foundation.
Under Esquel’s guidance, with the endorsement of the village council, project and resource access
was determined by minga participation or payment of fines.

Statecraft, Bureaucratic Power, and Disaster Recovery
What explains the contrasts in minga practice and governance in Manzano and Pusuca? One key
factor appears to be the intersection of local patron–clientelism with the dual trends of
decentralization and recentralization in Ecuador. A second key factor is the paternalistic intervention
of the Esquel Foundation in the Pusuca resettlement. Finally, the intersection of these factors with
some of the particular types of local agency afforded in post-disaster contexts helps shed light on
the changes in and diversity of minga practice.
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As a result of the dual trends in decentralization and recentralization, local development in
Canton Penipe increasingly involved pursuing three funding strategies, often in concert with one
another: appeals to ministries of the federal government to fund local projects (e.g., education,
infrastructure, health campaigns); courting support from the Provincial Council of Chimborazo for
potable water, irrigation, roads, and environmental projects—carried out under the banner of the
minga por la vida (minga for life) program that tied project funding to volunteer citizen labor
participation; and soliciting funding from NGOs and foundations for economic development projects.
The relative autonomy of the village councils allowed a great deal of creativity in pursuing these
multiple channels, but it also enabled a presidio of local patron–clientelism by obscuring the class
differences that inhered in local minga practice. Outside agencies were attracted by the image of
well-organized villages, but perceived little beyond the superficial performance of minga
organization. Local leaders were therefore able to buttress their own power by brokering outside
resources through minga organization, thereby reproducing the relational basis of the clientelist
political system.
In contrast, while minga organization and project benefit inclusion were likewise entangled
in Pusuca, here it unfolded quite differently. As in Manzano, mingas and meetings were organized
and enforced via raya attendance credits and were also held to attract outside agency support.
Under the influence of the Esquel Foundation, minga participation was routinized, based on clear
and relatively strict institutional parameters, and enforced through specific sanctions, including fines
and exclusion from common resources, such as irrigation. List-making was meticulous and there
were no favors. Both the Pusuca Council and Esquel focused on community organization to attract
funding and project support from outside donors, and minga labor underwrote the irrigation canal
project funded by the World Bank and the Provincial Council of Chimborazo. Esquel played a central
role in attracting outside agencies to the community and they successfully brought in funding from
dozens of NGOs to support micro projects in Pusuca, ranging from park construction, to
greenhouses, potable water, and computer facilities.
Another key difference between these sites was the imposition of the tarea system,
previously employed to regulate labor parties on area haciendas. No one seemed to recall who
proposed it (it was first applied in early 2011, before I returned to the field). Several villagers noted
that it was not imposed by Esquel and that it came from the community, but no one could tell me
whose suggestion it was. Santos Romero, an able-bodied single man in his late thirties, said he might
have suggested it, but he could not recall. He said he had been dismayed that labor was measured by
time and not effort, meaning that some people did the bulk of the work. However, minutes for
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village council meetings in late 2010 and early 2011 suggest that Esquel representatives raised the
need to standardize the minga output of each household in order to coordinate work on the
irrigation canal. It was in the context of heated conversations on this topic that the village assembly
developed the tarea rule.
There was another level of enforcement and local governance that was significant in
Pusuca—the granting of house and property deeds to resettlers. Esquel began granting deeds in mid
2010 to beneficiaries who had regularly met their obligations to the community—mandatory
attendance at monthly village meetings and weekly mingas, and payment of monthly dues. Village
council president, Angel Turushina, told me that most people had deeds to their houses and property
by mid 2011. He said that although fulltime occupation was not a condition of receiving deeds,
minga and council participation was, and several households were still on a trial period until they
had completed their obligations. When discussing the degree of decision-making autonomy Esquel
allowed the village council with Martha Santiago, I mentioned that I had witnessed her predecessor
intervene in 2009 when the village assembly voted to evict an elderly resettler. When she mentioned
they would not allow evictions, she said that Esquel themselves could no longer rightfully evict
people. I asked her how this could be so, since they were withholding deeds:

You see, it’s like a trick that I pulled. I still have the deeds of those who barely occupy their
homes. I told them I will give them the deeds when they complete their obligations to the
community and when they occupy the houses. But … legally, they already have their deeds,
just not the paper. They could go to the Registry [of Property] any day to request their deeds
and they would give them to them.

Thus, by implementing the tarea system, Esquel helped foster the development of minga practice as
a leveling device. This was facilitated by two factors: Esquel withheld key resources—most notably,
property deeds—from resettlers in order to enforce minga and community participation and
adherence to community standards; and this manipulation was abetted by the resettlers
themselves—and often the poorest among them—who, anxious about the precarity of their own
access to resources, eagerly policed their neighbors. They kept meticulous accounting of
participation and were relentless in using gossip as a first order sanction for nonconformity. This
type of statecraft was decidedly parlous—dependent on the sly paternalism of Esquel, which
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momentarily neutralized class politics, while in some ways standing in as the conspicuous
giver/withholder character that hitherto had been played by local patrons.

Conclusions
Both communities were striving towards a sort of unity based on the leveling mechanism of listmaking, although as I encountered them, this was decidedly precarious in different but related ways.
In Manzano, cooperation was organized through reciprocal exchange ties within the core group and
the conspicuous giving of access to resources by the council president. Although they employed lists,
their utility was ephemeral. They were not referenced or drawn upon for historical patterns and had
little or no leveling effect on relational differences. Much like Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) discussion of
number in the colonial imagination, list-making in Manzano let people know they were being
watched and evaluated and that those who kept the lists held the power. In contrast to the
scattered notebooks of Manzano, the council and committees in Pusuca kept rigorous attendance
records on spreadsheets, which community leaders and Esquel referred to in order to determine
eligibility for project and resource inclusion—which was much more dependent upon relationships
in Manzano.
For all their differences, there was a commonality in minga practice across the two villages:
both revealed processes and relationalities at the intersection of local and extra-local power. In
Manzano, the tools of statecraft only thinly veiled practices embedded in interpersonal relations and
local politics, where dissent was sanctioned with exclusion. In many ways this was a revanchist
response to a resettlement whose agencies and landless territory undermined the legitimacy of
traditional political leaders: here, minga practice was a reassertion of local power. However, the
precariousness of statecraft was no less palpable in Pusuca, where list-making and decisions on
resource and project inclusion were arbitrated by the Esquel Foundation. In Pusuca, everyone
answered to a council that in practice was difficult to distinguish from the foundation. Power
brokerage was not truly established by the community and it could be lost entirely through
cooptation by the foundation or devolve into forms of dyadic reciprocity and patronage, as in
Manzano. And yet, whether it was through forms of reciprocity that have been central to so many
historical forms of Andean statecraft, or by standardizing and regulating participation, both local
councils and NGOs were able to secure outside support for development projects and recruit minga
participants to realize collective objectives. Alas, this came with the exclusion of those whose labor
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and exchange relations were perceived as nonconforming in these respective regimes of minga
practice.
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Notes

1

All names are pseudonyms.

2

Locals engaged in a code switching of sorts, sometimes de-emphasizing disaster risk

designations because they believed it would inhibit their ability to secure scarce resources
(e.g., credit and infrastructure), while in other contexts, which might legitimize claims to
formal support (e.g., housing and infrastructure), they emphasized the designation.
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